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Over the past two decades, a large number of developing and transition countries
have implemented financial reforms, which are only beginning to attract attention of
researchers who want to study banking efficiency in diverse market structures and
environments. For example, government ownership of banks is very common in emerging
markets where, after decades of excessive government regulatory controls and dominance
of state-owned banks, foreign and private banks have recently been allowed to compete
freely. Empirical evidence from developing countries increasingly suggests that state-
owned banks are least efficient in utilization of banking resources [Barth et al. (1999),
Berger et al. (2005), Patti and Hardy (2005)]. Of central concern has been political rent-
seeking through lending practices of state-owned banks.
1 Rent-seeking firms are found
to borrow more from government banks leading to growing non-performing loan
portfolios [Khwaja and Mian (2005)]. Likewise, Berger et al. (2004) have noted that
domination of state-owned banks in developing countries may lower GDP growth.
Liberalization and reforms have been introduced in many developing countries to
address similar set of issues. Under this approach foreign and private banks have been
allowed to compete freely with state-owned banks. Presence of foreign-owned banks
in developing and transition countries has been associated with mixed performance.
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Although empirical research on comparative efficiency of foreign and domestic banks
has largely remained limited, yet it has a wider appeal.
In this paper we contribute to the literature on comparative efficiency of domestic and
foreign banks with specific reference to Pakistan, which offers an interesting case study.
Financial reforms in Pakistan have transformed the banking industry during the 1990s.
These reforms included licensing of several new private and foreign banks, higher
supervision and strengthening of prudential regulations aimed at improving financial
systems and monetary management. To this end, we use a unique bank level data of
40 commercial banks of Pakistan for the period 1991–2000 and use frontier efficiency
measure of data envelopment analysis (DEA) to construct efficiency indexes for each
bank. For analytical purposes, we divide our sample into state-owned, private and
foreign banks. We construct efficiency frontiers on pooled data of each yearly cross-
section of banks after standard parametric and non-parametric tests confirmed that these
banks come from the same population distribution. To study temporal relationships,
we divide the sample into pre-reform (1991-92), first-reform (1993-96) and second-
reform (1997-00) periods.3
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1See for instance LaPorta et al. (2002), Dinc (2005), Brown and Dinc (2005), Khawaja and Mian (2005), Faccio
(2006).
2See among others Havrylchyk (2006), Patti and Hardy (2005), Ataullah et al. (2004), Hasan and Marton (2003),
Isik and Hassan (2002), Grigorian and Manole (2002), Bhattacharyya et al. (1997).
3This classification resembles with Patti and Hardy (2005) who consider a pre-reform period (pre-1993), first-
reform period (1993-97) and second-reform period (1998-02).The results obtained indicate strong evidence that banks adjust to enhanced competition
in the initial period of reforms when banks move away from their efficient frontier, but
efficiency significantly improves in more advanced stages of reforms. The results
suggest that the first-phase of reforms failed to convert cost inefficient banks into
efficient banks. A comparison of measured efficiency provides some useful insights
and shows that foreign and private banks post superior performance while state-owned
banks struggle to compete during the reform process. Our multivariate regression results
predict the importance of link between bank size, asset quality, bank branches, and
share of non-performing to total loans with efficiency indexes.
Section 2 outlines the financial reforms and the evolving role of private and foreign
banks in Pakistan. Section 3 lays out the empirical design for measurement of frontier
efficiency while Section 4 provides description of the data and construction of variables.
Section 5 pertains to measurement of efficiency and interpretation of results while
Section 6 discusses the determinants of banking efficiency. Finally, Section 7 concludes
the paper with commentary on major findings.
2. Financial Reforms and Embryonic Role of Foreign and Private Banks in Pakistan
In Pakistan, with nationalization of the entire banking and insurance sector in 1972,
five nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) were set up after merger of some nationalized
banks. These NCBs maintained their dominance in providing financial intermediation
services in the country from 1972 to 1990. By this time, five public sector banks
dominated the scene with their holding of 92% share in total banking assets while the
rest of the share was in the hands of foreign commercial banks [State Bank of Pakistan
(2003)].
Since the nationalization of commercial banks in 1972, private ownership of banks
was not allowed until this ban was lifted as part of financial sector reforms in 1991.
The first-reform period was characterized by liberalization and institutional strengthening
of the banking sector [State Bank of Pakistan (2003)]. Liberalization started when ten
new private banks were granted permission to operate in 1991, of which eight banks
started operations in the later-half of 1992 and the other two joined later. Three new
foreign banks were also established in later half of 1992 while two provincial government
banks were scheduled in September 1994. Competition was also introduced by
privatization of government owned Muslim Commercial Bank and Allied Bank with
transfer of control to the private sector by 1993.
While a moratorium was introduced on new banks in 1995, private and foreign
banks were allowed to grow and extend operations by easing of branch policy in 1995
whereby controls on opening of new bank branches were removed. Self governance
of banks was also strengthened by amendments in Banking Companies Ordinance 1962
in February 1993 while prudential regulations were strengthened in 1994 with focus
on capital adequacy, adequate provisioning for non-performing loans and loan recovery
mechanisms.
The first set of reforms became effective from 1993-96 while a second set of further
reforms were initiated between 1997 and 2000. For example, in January 1997 eligible
banks were allowed to offer fund management and investment advisory services, while
Abid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
21For a review of this literature, see among others, Berger and Humphrey (1997), and Lovell (1993).
in May 1997 the Banking Council of Pakistan was dissolved and the control of state-
owned banks was given directly to State Bank of Pakistan. In the same year, CAMELS
framework was introduced in line with the Basil Accord. Moreover, minimum paid-
up capital requirement was set at Rs.500 million in December 1997.
Due to the embryonic role of foreign and private banks, the share of state-owned
banks in bank deposits gradually declined from 93% in 1990 to only 56% in 2000 while
the share of private banks increased from zero to about 30% in the same period. Because
the financial reforms changed the general business environment in which the state-
owned, private and foreign banks operated, it is very likely that the efficiency and
productivity of these banks may have varied over time. In particular, improved bank
management practices due to enhanced competition, prudential regulations especially
those relating to elimination of directed credit for state-owned banks, provisioning for
the non-performing loans, and restructuring of some state-owned banks etc., are likely
to be most significant in determining their comparative efficiency.
3. Empirical Design for Frontier Efficiency
We measure banking efficiency by the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which
was originally developed by Charnes et al. (1978) and has been used by many recent
studies in estimating banking efficiency [see, among others, Havrylchyk (2006), Beccalli
et al. (2006), Drake et al. (2006), Izik and Hassan (2002)].4 Some major benefits
associated with the DEA method are i) its parsimonious nature toward the data, and
ii) its property of not imposing a functional form on the data due to which it operates
well with mixed sizes of banks. Because the objective of this paper is to examine
efficiency of each yearly cross-section of banks from 1991-2000 and our data have
mixed sizes of banks, we prefer the DEA approach over other alternatives.
It should be emphasized that estimates of cost efficiency have dominated the recent
banking literature on the assumption that bank management has better control over
their costs rather than their outputs [Goddard et al. (2001)]. Since our interest in this
paper is also to evaluate how banks were able to reduce their costs after the financial
reforms, cost efficiency measurement is our preferred choice.
The DEA method to frontier estimation involves construction of non-parametric
best-practice frontier or a piecewise linear surface obtained from the observed data set,
which serves as the reference point or benchmark for comparison. The resultant
efficiency measure, ranging between zero (least efficient) and one (most efficient),
depicts the distance from each unit to frontier. Cost (or economic) efficiency (CE) of
a bank defines a composite measure of productive efficiency that includes allocative
efficiency (AE) and technical efficiency (TE). Allocative inefficiency refers to failure
of banks in choosing correct input combination given their factor prices while TE
measures the ratio of inputs technically necessary to the inputs actually employed.
The non-parametric cost minimizing approach used in this paper allows us to break
down CE into its different components. Following Fare et al. (1994), we use input price
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envelopment form of linear programming (LP) problem
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where wi and yi is for input prices and output levels, respectively for the ith decision-
making units (DMU) and xi* represents the cost minimizing vector of input quantities.
The cost efficiency of each observation indicates the amount by which cost of production
is increased due to technical and allocative inefficiency. For example, a CE score of
0.85 for a bank indicates that the bank could save 15% of the costs by being fully
efficient.
In our context, TE simply means the maximum possible output for each combination
of inputs. Banks producing on the frontier are efficient, while banks inside the frontier
are inefficient. For illustration purposes, consider a banking industry which uses a
single input, which can be converted into output. In this case, a bank using one unit
of the input to produce one unit of output would get TE score of 1 (1/1) or 100%
efficiency. Another bank using six units of input and producing three units of output
would get TE score of 0.5 (3/6) or 50% efficiency. A score of 0.5 for a bank indicates
that the bank could raise output by 50% by becoming efficient and moving to the
frontier.  To measure TE, we specify input oriented linear programming problem of
the form
The allocative efficiency is calculated residually by dividing CE with technical
efficiency (TE), or AE = CE/TE. By its nature, the above procedure of cost efficiency
includes any slacks into allocative efficiency, which is justified by Ferrier and Lovell
(1990) on the grounds that slacks reflect sub-optimal input mix.
In this problem,   is a scalar;   is a n x 1 vector of constants; X is the (k x n) matrix
of inputs where n represents the number of DMUs ; Y is the (m x n) matrix of outputs.
For the ith DMU, the vectors xi and yi represent the inputs and outputs, respectively.
The value of   represents TE score for the ith DMU, where the condition    1 holds.
To obtain the value of   for each DMU we solve LP problem n times. Due to constant
returns to scale the LP problem in Eq.(2) does not fully envelop the data set and thus
enlarges the feasible region. Therefore, in the second step, to measure
(1)
(2)PTE scores we relax the assumption of CRS by introducing the convexity constraint
 in to Eq.(2). A measure of scale efficiency is obtained by taking the ratio of
scores for TE and PTE. A problem in measuring scale efficiency (SE) with the  above
approach is that it does not identify the returns to scale. We resolve this problem by
running an additional DEA problem by imposing non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS),
which implies substituting the   restriction with  .
A common difficulty in measurement of TE with DEA approach is known as input-
 and output-slacks.  These are sections of the piecewise linear frontier that run parallel
to the x-axis or y-axis, which could lead to inaccurate measurement of technical, pure
technical and scale efficiency. We use a multi-stage methodology suggested by Coelli
et al. (1998) that takes care of the problem of slacks successfully.
4. Data and Construction of Variables
While most previous studies on banking efficiency in Pakistan have employed the
data from Banking Statistics of Pakistan published by the State Bank of Pakistan (2001),
inappropriate aggregation of assets, liabilities, costs and revenues and lack of data on
the number of bank employees has been cited as major problems in this data [Saeed
(2002), Razzaq (2002), Patti and Hardy (2005)].
Hence for this paper we collect data from the annual reports of banks for the period
1991 through 2000.5 The data are unique in terms of detail and coverage. Our sample
consists of all state-owned, private and foreign banks that operate at some point in time
between 1991 and 2000. Two small banks (e.g., Gulf Commercial Bank and Bank of
Ceylon) were excluded from the sample because their annual reports were not available
from any source.
Our sample consists of 40 banks out of which 21 banks had complete data from
1991 to 2000 while 33 banks had time-series data from 1992 to 2000. The final sample
consists of 366 observations over the ten year period with an average of more than 36
banks per annum. Due to entry of several new banks in early and mid-1990s and
exit/merger of a couple of banks after 1998, the number of observations varies over
time. In this way we collect data of 23 commercial banks for the year 1991, 36 banks
for the period 1992–1994, 39 banks for 1995, 40 banks for 1996–1998, 39 banks for
1999, and 37 banks for 2000.
A long standing debate in the banking literature on the definition and physical
measurement of bank inputs and outputs has failed to produce a consensus on how best
to measure them [Sealey and Lindley (1977)]. However, researchers generally adopt
either the production or the intermediation approach. The production approach takes
the view that banks are producers of loans and deposit account services by using labour
and capital as key inputs. Hence the number of accounts best measure output as opposed
to dollar value of deposits. Under this approach cost of production includes operatingcosts
exclusive of interest expenses.
Abid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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5The annual reports were obtained from the State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi; Ministry of Finance, and the Statistics
Division of the Government of Pakistan, Islamabad; Securities and Exchange Commission, Islamabad; Head
offices of commercial banks; and branch offices of commercial banks.The intermediation approach, however, takes the view that banks are intermediaries
of financial services whereby they collect purchased funds and convert them into loans,
advances, investments and other assets while total costs are defined to include interest
costs along with other operating costs.
Abid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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6See for instance, Berger and Mester (1997), Mukherjee et al. (2001), Isik and Hassan (2002), Patti and Hardy
(2005), Kwan (2006), and Havrylchyk (2006) among many others.
For our purposes, the intermediation approach seems more relevant because interest
costs account for more than 70% of the total costs in Pakistani banks. Therefore, like
several other studies6 on banking efficiency (including those dealing with issues of
multi-period efficiency of banks), we also adopt the intermediation approach. We take
deposits as input and include interest costs in the total costs. To calculate various
efficiency measures we use three outputs: (i) loans and advances, (ii) investments, and
(iii) contra accounts, and four inputs: (i) labour, (ii) physical capital, (iii) operating
cost, and (iv) financial capital. Table 1 presents our definition of total cost, outputs,
inputs and price of inputs while Table 2 reports summary statistics of these variables.7Abid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
8
5. Results
5.1 Production Frontier for State-owned, Private and Foreign Banks
We begin by asking if state-owned, private and foreign banks in our sample employ
same or somewhat different production technologies.7  If they operate in different legal
and business environments, then pooling of the data in each cross-section may not be
appropriate. To address this issue, we compute DEA cost, allocative, technical, pure
technical and scale efficiency of state-owned, private and foreign banks relative to their
pooled and separate frontiers.8
To allow inefficiency to vary over time, we construct efficiency frontiers for each
yearly cross section of banks by solving LP problems rather than constructing one
multi-year frontier.9
The efficiency measures for pooled and separate frontiers are presented in Table
3 where we note that mean efficiency of separate frontier for each yearly cross-section
and bank type is either equal to or greater than mean efficiency of pooled frontier,
which is an indication that pooled frontier always envelops separate frontier in our
sample. Following Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990) and Isik and Hassan (2002), we
continue and test the null hypothesis that efficiency distributions of the state-owned,
private and foreign banks obtained from pooled sample are same as the distributions
obtained from separate frontier by a) the analysis of variance test; b) Kruskal-Wallis
test; and c) the Median test. From test statistics reported in Table 4, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the three banking samples follow identical production technology,
which indicates that the data of three types of banks can be pooled. This is consistent
with the results obtained, for pooled frontier always envelops separate frontier in our
sample. Following Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990) and Isik and Hassan (2002), we
continue and test the null hypothesis that efficiency distributions of the state-owned,
private and foreign banks obtained from pooled sample are same as the distributions
obtained from separate frontier by a) the analysis of variance test; b) Kruskal-Wallis
test; and c) the Median test. From test statistics reported in Table 4, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the three banking samples follow identical production technology,
which indicates that the data of three types of banks can be pooled. This is consistent
with the results obtained, for example, by Sathye (2001) and Isik and Hassan (2002)
who also failed to reject the null hypothesis for the Australian and Turkish banks,
respectively.
7We use the definition of the State Bank of Pakistan to categorize commercial banks into state-owned, private and
foreign banks [State Bank of Pakistan (2003), chapter 3].
8We do not extend the hypothesis test to PTE and SE because they are obtained by decomposing TE and, therefore,
are expected to follow same pattern as TE.
9For some other multi-year efficiency studies constructing frontiers for each cross-section see Bauer et al. (1993),
DeYoung and Hasan (1998), Isik and Hassan (2002), Havrylchyk (2006).Abid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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5.2 Financial Reforms and Trends in Banking Efficiency
To investigate the impact of financial reforms on banking efficiency, we evaluate
time series properties of five DEA efficiency indexes for each cross-section of banks
in our full sample (Table 5). In general, banks in our sample exhibit average cost
efficiency of 74.5% from 1991 to 2000, which is in line with some other studies
conducted on the banking sectors of emerging and developing economies [see, among
others, Isik and Hassan (2002), Kwan (2006)].  From its highest levels in pre-reform
period (1991-92) the indices of mean (median) efficiency consistently declines in first-
reform period (1993-96). These results suggest that banks on average have moved away
from the efficient cost frontier during the first reform period (1993-96).
Part of the problem is that the earning and profitability of several banks fell in 1996
due to higher provisioning for exacerbated problem of non-performing loans.10 However,
in the second-reform period (1997-2000), mean and median efficiency indexes post a
dramatic recovery in efficiency ratings first from 1996 to 1997 and then from 1998 to
2000 with mean CE of 72% for this period.
10 While the ratio of non-performing loans to gross advances started rising in early 1990s, major provisioning for
these loans took place in 1996. Before 1996 the banks followed a practice of rescheduling loans (called ‘ever-
greening) that otherwise should have become non-performing [State Bank of Pakistan (2003)].Abid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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Across the entire sample, CE efficiency index in 1991is 91%; this fell to 46% in
1996 before recovering to more than 76% in 2000 while mean AE and TE indexes also
fell from more than 90% in 1991 to less than 75% in 1996 before their recovery to
more than 86% in 2000. Likewise, PTE and SE indexes also follow a similar pattern
in the study period.  These results contradict the conclusions reached by some earlier
studies on Pakistan’s banking sector. For example, Patti and Hardy (2005) show that
average efficiency of banks increased in pre-reform (1981-1992) and first-reform (1993-
1997) periods, but they did not find enough evidence to suggest that efficiency of these
banks increased in the second-reform period (1998-2002). However, Ataullah et al.
(2004) conclude that banking efficiency increased in the pre-reform (1988-1991) and
initial liberalization (1992-1994) periods, albeit at a slower pace, but significantly
increased during 1995-1998 period. Different trends in efficiency found by earlier
studies across the three time periods might relate to their data problems to which Patti
and Hardy (2005) continue to draw our attention.
Next, we examine how long bank level efficiency has persisted over the period of
financial reforms. This question is addressed by examining the temporal relationship
of the cross-sectional rank order efficiency of each of the 33 banks in our sample for
which we had complete time series data from 1992 to 2000. In Table 6, the Spearman’s
rank order correlation coefficients of efficiency estimates for 33 banks are reported,
which suggest that the temporal rank orders of CE and PTE are significantly correlated
for six subsequent years at the 1% level while AE, TE and SE indexes of efficiency
did not persist for more than two years and demonstrated a more transitory pattern
afterwards. This evidence is somewhat similar to the conclusions drawn by Kwan
(2006) and Eisenbeis et al. (1999) for commercial banks in Hong Kong, and bank
holding companies in the US, respectively. The analysis further reveals that, in general,
the first phase of financial reforms (1993-96) failed to convert cost inefficient banks
into efficient banks while in the second phase of reforms (1997-00) some success was
achieved, but that too was transitory.12The year 1998 was most eventful in Pakistan’s history due to nuclear detonation followed by economic sanctions
on Pakistan forcing the government to freeze the foreign currency accounts in summer 1998 in all Pakistani
banks.
14Some of these attributes relate to “political intervention, over-staffing, over-branching and inefficiencies”, which
have led “to the problems of large non-performing loans,13 high administrative expenses, huge losses and eroding
capital base” [State Bank of Pakistan (2003)].
15More specifically, foreign banks provided such services as traveler’s cheques, credit cards, automated teller
machines (ATM), etc. more than a decade ago, while their domestic counterparts were not so quick in responding
to these initiatives.
Abid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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5.3 Efficiency Differentials between State-owned, Private and Foreign Banks
Table 3 and Figure 1 through Figure 5 give efficiency results for the state-owned,
private and foreign banks. A comparison of mean efficiency indexes indicates that
foreign and private banks are generally more efficient than the state-owned banks.11
These results suggest strong similarity between relative efficiency of domestic and
foreign banks to that found by some other studies [see for instance, Ataullah et al.
(2004) for Pakistan, and Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) for India].
In terms of cost efficiency we note in Figure 1 that foreign banks out-perform state-
owned and private banks in pre-reform (1991-92) and first-reform period (1993-96).
However, we witness a fall in mean efficiency of foreign banks vis-à-vis private banks
around 1998, explained by freezing of foreign currency accounts leading to sharp fall
in foreign currency deposits of foreign banks and a contraction in their assets.12  These
results are in line with the conclusions drawn by Ataullah et al. (2004) for Pakistani
banks around the same period. Quite a similar picture is depicted in Figure 2 and Figure
3 about allocative and technical efficiency where foreign and private banks post much
superior performance than state-owned banks The performance of private commercial
banks as a group is remarkable given that they were newly established and were small
in size.13 Superior cost efficiency of private commercial banks vis-à-vis state-owned
banks may be attributable to their better management techniques based on flexible
market oriented policies aided by young, astute and energetic mid-level management,
which was hard to find in state-owned banks. Poor performance of state-owned banks
may be attributed to a host of political and managerial attributes.14
Figure 2 indicates that foreign and private banks experience highest AE scores (or
lowest allocative inefficiency) while these scores are lowest for state-owned banks (or
highest allocative inefficiency). High allocative inefficiency of state-owned banks could
be attributed to their managers’ inability to choose correct input mix due to lack of
independence. Foreign banks post superior technical efficiency as compared with state-
owned and private banks in first- and second-reform periods, except in post-1998 period
(Figure 3) for the reasons discussed earlier. Foreign banks led technical efficiency drive
by introducing new and superior banking and customer support services that were non-
existent in domestic banking sector until few years ago.15 TE roughly remains stable
for all the three categories of banks in first-reform period (1993-00) with a fall in
efficiency score in 1996, which shows remarkable recovery in second reform periodAbid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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Figure 1: Mean Cost Efficiency of Banks,
1991-2000
Figure 2: Mean Allocative Efficiency of Banks,
1991-2000
Figure 3: Mean Technical Efficiency of Banks,
1991-2000
Figure 4: Mean Pure Technical Efficiency of Banks,
1991-2000
Figure 5: Mean Scale Efficiency of Banks, 1991-2000Abid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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(1997-00). The main source of divergence from efficient frontier around 1996 lies with
state-owned and private banks because they used more banking resources than technically
necessary to produce banking output. Liberalization and competition in later period
forced domestic banks to take initiatives and introduce more modern technological
innovations such as facility of ATMs, telephonic banking, and internet banking, etc.
A major source of technical inefficiency for state-owned and private banks is PTE
while for foreign banks scale inefficiency is more significant (see Figure 4 & Figure
5). Due to superior service quality offered by private and foreign banks, state-owned
banks faced difficulties in maintaining market share in deposits, advances and investment.
State-owned banks were also plagued by the problems of high administrative expenses
(due to over staffing, over branching and large non-performing loans) leading to input
use inefficiency reflected by PTE, i.e., TE net of scale or output related effects. Foreign
banks performed fairly well in terms of their PTE until 1995 after which they faced a
rising trend in their operating cost (a) due to higher expense per employee, and (b) due
to freezing of foreign currency accounts in 1998. Moreover, since foreign banks devoted
more than 95% of their investment in government securities [State Bank of Pakistan
(2003)], a declining yield on six-month treasury bills was also responsible for this input
related inefficiency of foreign banks.
5.4 Returns to Scale
In Table 7 we report the returns to scale, which indicates that most Pakistani commercial
banks operate on the flatter portion of their cost curves. However, 23% of the banks
exhibit increasing returns to scale suggesting that these banks can gain by increasing
their size because they operate on the downward sloping portion of their cost curve.
By contrast, 33% of the banks exhibit decreasing returns suggesting that over-expansion
is a cause for concern for these banks.
The majority of state-owned banks (56.4%) experience decreasing returns to scale
(DRS) confirming the extra cost incurred by them. This result makes sense if seen in
the historical perspective when in the pre-reform era, due to curbs on new entry, state-
owned banks were meeting excess demand for financial services by producing more
than the optimum scale. For the same reason, share of scale inefficient (DRS) state-
owned banks is highest in 1992 after ten new banks entered the market. After a brief
period of improvement in mid-1990s the share of scale inefficient banks peaked in
1997, which prompted policy makers to introduce major restructuring and downsizing
plan. Due to these measures share of scale inefficient banks temporarily decreased
(from 87.5% in 1997 to 37.5% in 1998) before rising in 2000. By contrast, state-owned
banks operating on their downward sloping portion of average costs persistently failed
to increase size to gain from scale economies.
The returns to scale of private banks also paint a dismal picture where out of 12
private banks, on average, six banks expanded operations after 1995 beyond their
efficient scale. Most foreign banks (58%) operate on their flatter portion of average
cost curve, or at the right scale, leaving no gain associated with change in scale of
production. A relatively smaller proportion of foreign banks (25.4%) also operate at
IRS, while quite a few of them (16.4%) operate at DRS. Note that in 1991 all foreign
banks operate at the efficient scale, but entry of some new foreign banks in 1992, andrising competition from newly opened private banks pushed some foreign banks into
incorrect scale. Moreover, scale inefficiency of foreign banks is also explained by their
untapped potential of increasing returns (due to fewer bank branches) and, by their
reliance on foreign currency accounts (due to which they failed to reach at the right
scale). Scale inefficiency due to DRS of foreign banks is related to failure of established
(large) foreign banks to achieve scale efficiency.
6. Explaining Determinants of Efficiency
We further investigate how banking efficiency measures are correlated with some
key bank related attributes. Because our DEA efficiency measures are truncated above
at 1, and there are many values of efficiency indexes being 1, this generates the Tobit
model
where   represents the efficiency indexes CE, AE, TE, etc.,   is a vector representing
explanatory variables,   represents estimated parameters while ei is for error term
distributed ~N(0,s
2).
The explanatory variables in this specification are discussed next. We use real asset
size, measured by natural logarithm of bank total assets at 1990/91 constant rupee, to
capture the effects of scale of operations on banking efficiency. While our initial
findings suggest that foreign and private banks are most efficient vis-à-vis state-owned
banks, the fact remains that all new foreign and private banks are typically small in
size. Moreover, some large foreign and state-owned banks are also very efficient.
Therefore, it would be interesting to see how asset size relates to different efficiency
measures in our sample.
Abid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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A larger share of earning assets to total assets is a sign of good asset quality, which
leads to higher profitability at given level of expenses. Therefore, we construct earning
assets to total assets variable to control for asset quality across banks in our sample.
Loans are considered least liquid and hence most risky of the banking assets. At another
level, loans are also a major source of operating income. To capture the liquidity and
sensitivity to market risk, we construct loans to deposit ratio. Therefore, an increase
in this ratio may associate with higher efficiency.
To control for the effects of ownership status of banks, we construct dummy variables
for state-owned, private and foreign banks and use state-owned banks as the base
category in the regressions. Finally, period dummies for three reform periods are also
included (but not reported) namely, pre-reform (1991-92), first-reform (1993-96) and
second-reform periods (1997-00) while taking pre-reform period as the benchmark.
For estimation purposes, we use pooled data of all banks in our sample.
The results presented in Table 8 suggest that the indicators of asset quality, liquidity
and sensitivity to market risk and bank size are strongly correlated with most of the
efficiency measures. As expected, the ratio of earning assets to total assets associates
positively with all the efficiency measures indicating that an increase in this ratio
increases banking efficiency. Likewise, loans to asset ratio is also significantly positive
in all the regressions indicating that concentration of banking assets on loans increases
their relative efficiency in our sample. This result is consistent with the conclusion
drawn by Isik and Hassan (2002) in the case of loans to total assets ratio for Turkish
banks.
The estimated coefficients are in each case, except AE, positive for the log (real
assets). To illustrate, the estimated coefficient in CE equation in Table 8 implies that
an increase in the log (real assets) by 1.52 (its standard deviation) increases cost
efficiency of banks by 5.9%. Such gains in efficiency associated with asset size are
largest in the case of PTE, i.e., 11.2 %. Our results also suggest strong similaritiesAbid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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between the impact of bank size on allocative efficiency index to that found by Isik
and Hassan (2002). We note that size of a bank is not significantly associated with its
AE index indicating that, irrespective of their size, banks may fail in equating their
marginal rates of substitution of factors with factor prices.
Our results on the effects of ownership type on cost efficiency of banks show that
foreign and private banks are significantly more efficient than state-owned banks in
our sample. The coefficient on foreign and private banks are large and positive in each
case while the estimated coefficient in CE equation predicts that on average foreign
and private banks are respectively 27% and 19% more cost efficient than state-owned
banks.
In addition to the above, we also run related specifications where we examine the
impact of non-performing loans and number of bank branches on efficiency indexes.
Recent cross-country evidence from emerging markets shows that political influence
on government-owned banks in major emerging markets increases their lending from
government-owned banks [La Porta et al. (2002), Dinc (2005), Brown and Dinc (2005),
Faccio (2006)]. More specifically, Khawaja and Mian (2005) present a stark picture
of political rent seeking by the politically connected firms in Pakistan through their
influence primarily on state-owned banks. Higher default rates of banks lead to swelling
of non-performing loan in the Pakistani context to which Patti and Hardy (2005) and
Ataullah et al. (2004) also continue to draw our attention. In essence, a rising trend in
the ratio of non-performing to total loans signals deteriorating quality of a bank’s asset
portfolio, which in turn lowers net income and risks solvency.
We evaluate their impact on banking efficiency by regressing efficiency index of
each bank on their ratio of non-performing to total loans. The results in Table 9 show
that cost inefficiency of banks stemming from non-performing loan comes through
failure of banks to be fully technically efficient. We find that every 10% increase in
ratio of non-performing to total loans decreases banks’ cost efficiency by 6%, technical
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Banks operating in rural markets maintain extended branch network, which is likely
to be a cause of their poor efficiency score. Private and foreign banks only operate in
big cities and towns with a limited network of bank branches. However, state-owned
banks operate with extended branch network both in urban and rural areas. Since the
delivery system in rural areas is very costly, banks operating rural branch network are
expected to maintain several loss making branches, which reflect poorly on their
efficiency. Therefore, number of bank branches, used as control for banking environment
is expected to be negatively correlated with efficiency indexes. Our regressions results
in Table 10 confirm that bank branches associate negatively with efficiency index of
banks. The estimated coefficient in CE equation implies that a decrease in the log of
the number of bank branches by 2.22 (its standard deviation) increases cost efficiency
of banks in our sample by 7.1%.
7. Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of financial reforms on banking efficiency of
state-owned, private and foreign banks in Pakistan by employing DEA frontier efficiency
measures using a unique data from 1991 to 2000. On the basis of estimation of yearly
cross-section data of 40 commercial banks with the DEA methodology, we distinguish
between cost, allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiency of banks. We
applied parametric and non-parametric tests to conclude that the data of state-owned,
private and foreign banks can be pooled because they employ identical production
technology. The paper applied maximum likelihood Tobit regression analysis to identify
the determinants of banking efficiency in Pakistan.
Measured efficiency of each yearly cross-section was found to decline in the first
reform period (1993-96), suggesting that Pakistani banks moved away from their
efficient cost frontier. This should not be surprising because consistent with the financial
reform process, banks were adjusting to liberalization, enhanced competition and
strengthening of prudential regulations of the banking sector. Moreover, the first phase
of financial reforms also failed to convert cost inefficient banks into efficient banks
as the rank order of cost efficiency of 33 banks (for which complete time series data
was available) persisted for six years. However, the measured efficiency was found to
improve after 1996 with the introduction of the second phase of financial reforms.
Whereas we find that mean cost efficiency of all banks in our sample for the period












Note: Results are based on a Tobit regression censored above at 1. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic
t-values. *** denote statistical significance at the 1% levels. Control variables include, earning assets to total
assets, loans to deposit ratio, period dummy for first-reform (1993 - 96), and period dummy for second-reform
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foreign banks was 60%, 75% and 80%, respectively. Therefore, the first general insight
of the paper relates to the relative performance of banks where we find that foreign and
private banks show superior performance in terms of factor productivity and in the use
of right input-mix while state-owned banks most inefficiently convert inputs into
outputs. This is consistent with the results obtained for Pakistani banks by other studies.
At the same time, our results also indicate that the performance of foreign banks
as compared with domestic banks was much better in the first-reform period (1993-
96) when consolidation of the banking sector was taking place due to financial reforms.
Relative cost efficiency of foreign banks fell in the second-reform period (1997-00)
vis-à-vis private banks, which may be attributed to the freezing of foreign currency
deposits by the government. Even though most Pakistani commercial banks operated
on the flatter portion of their cost curves about one-third of total banks were plagued
by over expansion of operations of which a large majority was state-owned banks.
Second, the paper shows the importance of the link between asset quality, measured
by earning assets to total assets, loans to deposit ratio as a source of operating income
and bank size measured by real total assets. The results from Tobit regressions suggest
that holding other things as constant, these indicators strongly correlate with most of
the efficiency indexes. While we establish a positive association between asset size
and efficiency indexes, size of bank is not significantly associated with allocative
efficiency of banks, which is a very similar result to those found by some other studies.
Thus, banks may fail in optimally allocating banking resources irrespective of their
size.
Third, the paper by shedding light on the effects of non-performing loans on the
relative efficiency of banks complements the results of other recent studies by indicating
the negative effects of political influence on bank decision-making, e.g., high default
rates by politically connected firms. While such defaults lead to swelling of non-
performing loan portfolios of Pakistani banks, we find that every 10% increase in the
share of non-performing to total loans decreases the efficiency index of banks from
6% to 12%.
The fourth general insight our paper provides relates to the influence of extended
bank branch network on efficiency index of these banks. Measured efficiency of banks
was found to be negatively associated with the number of bank branches. Foreign and
private banks mostly operate in urban areas with limited bank branches as compared
with state-owned banks, which operate with vast branch network both in urban and
rural areas where delivery system is costly. To the extent that over branching banks
are found to be less efficient, re-structuring plans for public sector banks have potential
pay-offsAbid A. Burki and G.S.K. Niazi / CMER Working Paper No. 06-49
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